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Abstract Several European countries have recently introduced or are planning 
to introduce citizenship trajectories (voluntary or obligatory inclusion programs 
for recent immigrants) or citizen integration tests (tests one should pass to be 
able and acquire permanent residence or state citizenship). Authors like Joppke 
claim this is an articulation of a more general shift towards the logic of 
assimilation (and away from a multicultural agenda) in integration policy 
paradigms of European States. Integration policies would even be converging in 
such a fashion that it would no longer make sense to think in terms of national 
models for immigrant integration. One cannot deny the empirical fact of diffusion 
of civic integration policies throughout Europe. This paper claims there is, 
however, still sufficient distinctiveness between immigrant integration policies in 
order to continue and use an analytical framework which distinguishes national 
models. 
 
Introduction 
 
Mid 1990s the Netherlands introduced citizenship trajectories for (non-EU) 
immigrant newcomers. New immigrants were obliged to take language lessons 
and a number of introductory courses on the institutions and practices of the 
receiving society. These courses were paid for by the state. People who refuse 
to take part in these programs risked penalties. Ten years onwards the Dutch 
citizenship trajectory scheme has toughened to a considerable degree. The 
program is now even meant to function as a filter for new immigration. Family 
formation is only possible if the incoming partner first passes a citizenship exam 
(including a Dutch language t est) in the country of origin. Furthermore, 
candidate migrants have to pay for all the costs themselves. The Dutch 
integration program, demanding a considerable amount of acculturation, is 
currently the strictest one in all of Europe. The Netherlands, known and praised 
in the 1980s and 1990s for its multicultural model, thus seem to have shifted to 
a more assimilationist position (Entzinger & Fermin, 2007).  
Since the Dutch have toughened their civic integration program, several 
European nation-states and regions have followed suit. Belgian neighbouring 
region Flanders basically copy pasted the original Dutch citizenship trajectories 
(inburgeringstrajecten) at the start of the new millennium.  When Germany 
introduced Integrationskurse, the Dutch program (partly) served as a model. 
Since the end of the 1990s, i ntegration courses and citizenship trajectories 
seem to be popping up all over Europe. France launched Contrats d’acceuil et 
de l’intégration  and Austria introduced  Integrationsvereinbarungen, contracts 
which have become a necessary intermediary step towards entitlement to a 
long term residence permit. The UK introduced  a  citizenship test ( a  test of 
language and  a  test of knowledge about life in the UK) in order to qualify for 
British citizenship. Estonia insists that  its sizeable Russophone minority first 
must pass an Estonian language and citizenship test before being entitled to Estonian  nationality. Poland, Hungary and Spain are contemplating special 
integration programs for newcomers. Non-EU member Switzerland is also 
debating the introduction of contrats d’intégration involving obligatory language 
courses and civic courses in its cantons. It would be incorrect, however, to think 
that it was merely the new Dutch model that triggered this wave of integration 
programs.  Scandinavian countries Denmark, Sweden and Finland  have 
programs which origins predate the Dutch experience. 
The  rapid diffusion of the idea and practice of  integration courses, 
citizenship trajectories and citizenship tests across Europe provides mounting 
proof of a convergence in immigrant integration policies, so it seems. In a well 
written and witty article Joppke (2007) claims the diffusion of civic integration 
courses and tests for newcomers attests to a convergent trend in immigrant 
integration policies. This convergence would make traditional national model 
assumptions obsolete: “The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if 
it ever did” (Joppke 2007: 2). We propose to not throw out the baby with the 
bath water. C ontrary to Joppke  we think that national models, as those 
proposed by Koopmans  et al. (2005), still make sense, albeit that traditional 
classifications might have to be re-examined. There is indeed some noteworthy 
convergence in policy towards newcomers, but there is still sufficient divergence 
in  policies towards immigrant ethnic minorities (and related dominant political 
discourses) across nation-states to continue analytically distinguishing national 
integration models.  
 
Citizenship trajectories and citizenship tests in Europe 
 
No less than nine EU-countries have in recent years introduced integration 
courses, citizenship tests and/or citizenship trajectories as instruments in their 
civic integration policies for immigrants.  Interestingly, EU nation states are 
adopting similar integration programs without this involving strictly guided 
coordination from the European Union level. There is no European directive on 
integration policy forcing member states to go in a particular direction. Since 
November 2004 there is, however, a European Council agreement on “common 
basic principles” of immigrant integration policy. These common basic principles 
are formulated in a rather general way and do not push member states in a 
clear manner to particular immigrant integration programs. One of the principles 
hints at the possible introduction of ‘integration courses’ and citizenship 
trajectories: 
 
“Basic knowledge of  the host society's language, history, and  institutions is 
indispensable to integration; enabling  immigrants to acquire this basic 
knowledge is essential to successful integration”
1 
 
When there  has been diffusion of ‘best practices’ in the field of immigrant 
integration programs  within the EU this has happened organically  and not 
because of clear-cut joint decision making, not even through the so-called ‘open 
method of coordination’ (Caviedes, 2004). Currently quite a number of EU 
member states seem to believe that integration courses are good practices. 
Instead of wanting to reinvent the wheel, they increasingly look at what is 
happening across their borders. Instruments as the ‘Handbook on integration for 
policy-makers and practitioners’ (Niessen & Schibel, 2004) facilitate cross-
national comparison. On this matter we can read the following in a report by the 
French Parliament: 
 « Tous les pays d’immigration sont confrontés, peu ou prou, aux mêmes 
difficultés. Pourquoi ne pas s’inspirer des bonnes idées, des bonnes pratiques 
de nos voisins – ils en ont souvent – et de ce qui marche chez eux ? Pourquoi 
ne pas profiter de leur expérience, et même de leurs échecs éventuels, pour 
éviter les « fausses bonnes idées » ? Chaque pays a ses traditions et son 
modèle en  matière d’intégration, et il ne s’agit pas de reproduire 
mécaniquement ou de « singer » ce qui fonctionne ailleurs, dans un contexte 
différent » (Délégation de l’Assemblée Nationale, 2006 : 12). 
 
Let us shortly present each of  the programs for immigrant integration of third 
country nationals in these countries. We did not include in our overview Estonia, 
which also has a citizenship test, because the Baltic state is a particular case (in 
light of the large number of stateless Russophones who in our opinion cannot 
really be considered to be immigrant TCNs).  
 
The Netherlands 
 
In 1998 the Netherlands introduced the Wet inburgering nieuwkomers (WIN), a 
scheme of so-called citizenship trajectories (Entzinger & Fermin, 2007). Newly 
arriving adult non-EU immigrants were obliged to take 600 hours of language 
courses and courses on ‘societal orientation’. These courses were financed by 
the central government and the municipalities. If a newcomer did not participate, 
the person was sanctioned. The aim was to assure rapid independence of 
newcomers.  
As a result of a new bill, the Wet Inburgering (WI), prepared by the 
centre-right government Balkenende-II since 2003, the citizenship scheme has 
been substantially altered from January 2007 onwards
2. Obligation to 
participate was modified into an obligation to pass end tests. Those failing to 
pass the test after three and a half years (maximum five years for asylum 
seekers) are sanctioned and will not be entitled to a permanent residence title. 
Having passed a (more difficult) language test and a test on Dutch society has 
equally become a prerequisite for naturalisation. Furthermore, the scheme was 
broadened to include not only newcomers but equally established immigrants 
groups not holding Dutch citizenship (and enjoying state benefits). At first, the 
hard-line right-liberal Minister of Justice and Integration Rita Verdonk  – 
nicknamed Iron Rita - wanted to oblige all non-EU origin immigrants, even those 
holding Dutch nationality, to pass the citizenship test. Due to its unconstitutional 
nature, this aspect of the new bill had to be abandoned by Verdonk. However, 
unlike in the old WIN-program, people under the new WI-program now have to 
pay for the courses and tests themselves – albeit that some municipalities will 
pay the fees for applicants.  
There was also a new citizenship test introduced for people wanting to 
come to the Netherlands (for instance in the framework of family formation or 
family reunification) and who need a residence permit.  This new regulation, 
introduced by the  Wet Inburgering Buitenland, is in effect since mid March 
2006. EU-nationals, holders of a working permit, temporary students and 
nationals of a number of non-EU countries (US, Canada, Australia, New-
Zeeland, Norway, Switzerland, etc.) are exempt of doing the test. Prospective 
immigrants first have to pass an automated citizenship test (costing 350€) at the 
Dutch embassy in the country of origin before being (potentially) allowed to 
move to the Netherlands. A basic knowledge of Dutch is a condition to be 
granted a residence permit. Candidates can prepare for the test after having 
acquired course material (63,90€) through Dutch bookstores (via the internet). 
In the video material footage on gay marriage (and topless women sunbathing at the beach) is shown in order to communicate the message that the 
Netherlands is a liberal society.  
 
Flanders (Belgium) 
 
Since the end of the 1990s the Flemish have been preparing and experimenting 
with so-called citizenship trajectories (inburgeringstrajecten) in which lessons on 
the Dutch language and lessons of introduction to Flemish/Belgian society are 
to be taken by certain categories of immigrant newcomers. The aim of the 
Flemish Degree on Civic Inclusion (Inburgering) is to actively promote a certain 
degree of language and cultural assimilation. This scheme, once again copied 
from the Netherlands, has become compulsory for (most) non-EU newcomers in 
Flanders from April 2004 onwards and optional in Brussels.  
Following a modification of the original Decree in 2006, from January 
2007 onwards established non-EU origin immigrants, including Belgian state 
citizens born outside of Belgium, have equally become target groups. For those 
groups who are obliged to attend citizenship courses ( i.e. most  non-EU 
newcomers and refugees) non-compliance can lead to fines ranging from 50 to 
5000 €. There is, for the moment, only an obligation to participate to citizenship 
trajectories, not to achieve a certain knowledge level, but the new Flemish 
Decree does foresee that at one point in time there will be actual  tests 
introduced.  There are  no consequences attached to non-compliance on the 
level of entitlement to residence permits or nationality acquisition, which are 
federal Belgian prerogatives. Access to social housing (a Flemish policy level 
prerogative) will, following a Flemish Decree voted in 2006, at some point in the 
future be limited to individuals sufficiently mastering the Dutch language  or 
participating to a citizenship trajectory scheme. The Flemish preoccupation with 
mastery of the Dutch language has to be understood in light of the on-going 
linguistic struggle in federal Belgium between the Flemish and the 
Francophones. 
The Flemish Government does not see a contradiction in combining a 
(more m ulticultural) targeted ethnic minorities policy with a  (more 
assimilationist) programme  for citizenship trajectories, although it has been 
gradually shifting the emphasis towards the idea of individual responsibility of 
immigrants. Albeit  that this point is  debatable, Flanders keeps nevertheless 
insisting that its civic integration policy is not aimed at “assimilation”: 
 
“We want to achieve social cohesion in which everyone’s particularity and 
cultural identity can prosper, but in which the current values, norms and rules of 
our democratic state and the rule of law, remain the corner stone of Flemish 
society. The Flemish Government judges it to be important that allochtonous 
Flemings do not give up their cultural and religious values, but rather integrate 
these as added values to Flemish society. Respect of diversity is one of the 
fundamental values of Flemish society: just like the equality of all humans, the 
separation of church and state and the freedom of expression”  (Flemish 
Government, 2004: 5). 
 
Germany 
 
Since 2005 a new “Zuwanderungsgesetz” is in place in Germany (Michalkowski 
2004; Carrera 2006; Joppke 2007). Newcomers can take 300 (up to 600) hours 
of German language classes and 30 hours of lessons on German society 
(culture, history, constitution, legal system and political institutions). Entitlement 
to a temporary residence permit depends on participating to the integration 
program, while permanent residence requires passing an exam. The program is obligatory for everyone not showing a minimal mastery of German and/or 
enjoying social benefits. Failure to attend can lead to a fine or a cut in social 
benefits of 10%. Non compliance could lead to a non-renewal of  a short term 
residence permit or refusal of a long term residence permit (but there are a lot 
of exceptions foreseen). In the (near) future attendance of integration courses 
and  passing of a language test will become a prerequisite for naturalisation. 
There are also plans to make a minimal knowledge of German a condition for 
family reunification. 
 
Austria 
 
Austria introduced integration contracts ( Integrationsvereinbarungen) in 2003 
(Michalkowski 2004; ICMD 2005). The program is obligatory for non-EU 
newcomers who arrived in the country after 1998. High-skilled professionals 
staying for less than two years in Austria and people who can prove sufficient 
knowledge of German (in a test) are exempt from the program. The signing of 
an integration contract is a prerequisite for entitlement to a residence permit (or 
its renewal). The integration program consists of language and civic education 
courses and is relatively limited in length (75 hours). About half of the costs are 
to be paid by the immigrant (or his employer). Alternatively, instead of taking the 
integration courses, one can pass a language certificate test 
(Sprachkenntnisnachweis). Delays in participation can lead to a halt in 
unemployment benefits, a shorter duration of the renewed residence permit, a 
lower participation by the state in the costs for attending the program or 
financial fines. Failure to participate within three years leads to non-renewal of 
the residence permit and even threat of expulsion. 
 
Denmark 
 
Denmark has an integration programme since 1986 focussed on refugees 
(Liebig, 2007).  In 1999 Denmark drastically modified its approach when 
introducing an Integration Act in which it is stipulated that in order to obtain a 
permanent residence permit, a newcomer – except when originating from a EU-
member state or a Nordic country - is obliged to participate in an introduction 
programme, especially when depending on social benefits (Michalowski, 2004). 
Newcomers who wish to participate in a language course but are not part of the 
target groups, can ask for a financial contribution. From 2004 onwards, 
language courses are provided on three different levels, with modules of about 
6 months (and 30 hours a week). The entire program is meant to be completed 
in a period of three years and can go up to 2000 hours of language education. 
At end of the entire education programme, the newcomers should pass a 
standardised exam. Active participation to the programme is an obligation for all 
target groups of the Integration Act. Starting July 2003, an adapted programme 
is compulsory for all asylum seekers. Non compliance leads to a reduction of 
social benefits (up to 30%), which are in fact granted under the form of an 
“integration allowance”
4. Furthermore, completion of the introduction 
programme is a condition for receiving a permanent residence permit. Having 
passed a language test and a test on Danish culture and history is part of the 
requirements to obtain Danish citizenship since end 2005.  
Because of the Danish opt-clause with regard to the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Denmark is not bound to implement the European directive on the right to family 
reunification nor the directive on the status of long-term third-country residents. 
As a result, Denmark has a requirement of 7 years of residence for obtaining a 
permanent residence permit. Furthermore, Denmark has imposed a  controversial age limit for marriages with third-country nationals at 24 years, 
while the European directive on the right to family reunification only allows an 
age limit of 21. Denmark also imposes a bank deposit (of about 7400 €) before 
family reunification is possible.  Denmark has announced it will, as the 
Netherlands have done, introduce an integration test as a precondition for 
family reunification in the future. 
 
Finland 
 
Finland introduced its Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of 
Asylum Seekers in 1999 (Michalowski 2004). On the website of the Ministry of 
Labour of Finland extensive information can be found in English on their 
integration program
5. Newcomers are expected to learn Finnish  (or Swedish) 
and acquire basic information on Finnish society. The individualised program 
has a duration of about 18 weeks and is part of a wider ‘integration plan’. It is 
obligatory for unemployed newcomers or newcomers on other social benefits 
schemes, but not for non-EU newcomers in general. Non compliance can in 
some cases lead to a reduction of social benefits. In fact, for the first three years 
of their stay in Finland, immigrants do not have the right to an unemployment 
benefit, but they do have the right to receive an “integration allowance” in return 
for participation to the integration program. Ingrians  – a Finnish speaking 
minority in Russia – have to prove knowledge of Finnish language, by passing a 
test, to make use of their right to migration to Finland.  
 
Sweden 
 
Sweden has a long tradition of organizing language courses for immigrants, 
dating back to the 1970s. Its current integration programme, offering both 
language courses as courses on Swedish society, is only compulsory for social 
benefit applicants. It is open to all types of immigrants, not only to newcomers 
and it paid for by the state. Municipalities are responsible for offering integration 
courses, which on average entail 525 hours of courses, although this can vary 
according to the individual situation of the immigrant. Foreigners receiving 
social benefits can see these being reduced or withdrawn upon failure to 
participate in language courses, vocational training or orientation courses.     
 
France 
 
In 1998 the socialist government launched  the “ plate-forme d’accueil”, a 
program meant to help newcomers get an understanding about the different 
institutions of the French welfare state (Joppke, 2007). A voluntary session of 
half a day was foreseen to explain the functioning of a set of crucial institutions, 
followed by an individual interview to check whether they had further specific 
needs. If needed, the newcomers could have their language knowledge tested 
and be directed to information about language courses.  
In 2002 a new centre-right government decided to create an alternative 
program of Contrats d’acceuil et de l’intégration, in vogue in all of France since 
2005. The program entails 200 to 500 hours of French language classes and six 
hours of lessons on the practical ins and outs of life in France (Délégation 
2006). Newcomers are not obliged to participate, but entitlement to a residence 
permit does depend on sufficient mastery of French or inclusion in a program 
for integration. Since 2006, citizenship is granted after a special ceremony but 
there are no citizenship tests to be taken in order to become a French national.   Interestingly, in  an overview report  on integration programmes of the 
Délégation de l’Assemblée Nationale pour l’Union Européenne (2006) it is 
suggested that France should  create a language test as a precondition for 
family reunification (as is the case in the Netherlands and has been announced 
in Denmark and Germany) and that it should formalize the criterion of 
knowledge of French for naturalization through a test.  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002 explicitly introduced a 
test to residents seeking British citizenship. Applicants should show “a sufficient 
knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic”
6 and also “a sufficient 
knowledge about life in the United Kingdom”
7 by passing a test (effectively 
implemented since 1 November 2005). Those immigrants seeking to settle in 
the UK (applying for an “indefinite leave to remain”) equally have to pass the 
test (effectively implemented since 2 April 2007). If one does not have sufficient 
knowledge of English, the applicant should attend English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes. Some categories can get free 
tuition, but in principle one has to pay for the classes, just like one has to pay for 
the test itself. In explanatory documents of the Home Office it is stressed the 
tests aim at “integration”, but without this meaning “complete assimilation” 
(Home Office, 2004: 14). In other words, there is still room for multiculturalism 
and in order to emphasize this point, reference is made to the particular position 
of the Welsh and Scottish in the UK: 
 
“ […] So to be British does not mean assimilation into a common culture so that 
original identities are lost. Assimilation to such a degree has not, after all, 
happened for most people in Wales and Scotland, nor historically for Irish and 
Jewish immigrant communities, not for smaller communities as the Poles who 
once fled from persecution. There is no reason why loss of a distinctive identity 
within a wider British identity should occur to immigrants from the new 
Commonwealth or from elsewhere” (Home Office, 2004: 15). 
 
Interestingly in this respect, questions asked during the citizenship test can vary 
according to the region (i.e. for instance Scotland with questions on the Scottish 
parliament). From a substantive point of view, other than respect for the general 
principles of the modern democratic state, no specific content is given to the 
idea of Britishness: 
 
“To be British seems us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected 
parliamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual 
tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our 
allegiance to the state (as commonly symbolised in the Crown) in return for its 
protection. To be British is to respect those over-arching specific institutions, 
values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures 
together in peace and in a legal order.” (Home Office, 2004: 15). 
 
Any democratic nation state will basically uphold these general principles linked 
to the rule of law. More typically – although not exclusive - British elements are 
the reference to the multinational character of the UK and the idea of allegiance 
to the Crown.  
 
 
 
 Table 1. Overview of characteristics of civic integration policies 
  AU  DK  DE  FI  FL  FR  NL  SW  UK 
Mandatory 
for (most) 
non-EU 
newcomers 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
Language 
training 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Vocational 
training or 
orientation 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
Civic 
orientation 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
History and 
culture 
NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  (YES) 
Courses are 
for free (or at 
minimal cost) 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
(YES) 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
(NO) 
Non 
compliance 
fined 
 
YES 
 
(NO) 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
(YES) 
 
NO 
 
NO 
Non 
compliance 
impact on 
social 
benefits 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
(NO) 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
Renewal of 
short term 
residence 
permit 
depends on 
participation 
 
 
YES 
 
 
NO 
 
 
(YES) 
 
 
NO 
 
 
NO 
 
 
(YES) 
 
 
YES 
 
 
NO 
 
 
NO 
Long term 
residence 
permit 
depends on 
participation 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
Test at the 
end of 
course 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
(NO) 
 
NO 
 
(NO) 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
(YES) 
Test for long 
term 
residence 
permit 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
  
YES 
Test 
precondition 
for 
immigration 
 
NO 
 
(NO) 
 
(NO) 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
Test for 
naturalization 
NO  (YES)  (YES)  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  YES 
 
Explanatory note for table 1 : AU=Austria, DK=Denmark, EE=Estonia, DE=Germany, 
FI=Finland, FL=Flanders, FR= France, NL=Netherlands, SW=Sweden, UK=United 
Kingdom. A response is put between brackets when the answer is not straightforward 
due to special provisions (or transitional measures). 
 
 
 Comparative assessment of integration programmes 
 
Let us now look into the convergence and divergence of all the aforementioned 
civic integration policies which we briefly discussed. Table 1 gives an overview 
to what extent the different national policies share a number of characteristic 
traits. We want to discuss a number of convergent and divergent traits of these 
integration programmes
8 by focussing on the following questions: 
  
(1) Is there a form of mandatory participation to integration courses for 
new non-EU migrants?  
(2)  Do the integration courses entail language training (2a), vocational 
training or orientation (2b) and knowledge on history and culture (2c)?  
(3) Is participation to integration courses free (or not very costly)?  
(4) Is there a fine in case of non-compliance?  
(5) Is there a cut in social benefits in case of non-compliance?  
(6) Is entitlement to a residence permit conditional on participation to an 
integration course?  
(7) Is there a test at the end of the citizenship trajectory? 
(8) Is the passing of a citizenship or integration test a pre-condition for 
permanent residence status?  
(9) Is the passing of a test a prerequisite for naturalization?   
 
An interesting  first resemblance in all countries is that in official discourse it is 
always denied that the integration courses and citizenship tests are aimed at 
assimilation. But let us focus on the actual traits and not on the political rhetoric. 
Except for the UK, all countries offer integration courses to newcomers. These 
courses typically entail language lessons and some kind of civic introduction. In 
a number of countries vocational training and professional orientation are 
equally part of the program. While at first, most integration programmes were 
for free (or nearly free), a number have started asking a fee to participants. Last 
but not least, one of the most important points of divergence is the voluntary or 
obligatory nature of the schemes and the consequences of non-compliance.  
  Analytically a number of general goals of the integration programs can 
be distinguished which are combined in several ways in the different countries 
and are, hence, not necessarily overlapping. One aim of integration courses is 
to stimulate socio-economic inclusion and facilitate independence of 
immigrants. Language courses and vocational training  are offered in order to 
enhance the chances of immigrants on the labour market and limit their 
dependence on social benefits. In most countries people who are dependent on 
state social benefits are explicitly targeted to make use of these inclusion 
programs and often there are sanctions foreseen in case of non compliance. 
This is not necessarily a typical trait of immigrant integration policy. In most 
cases it is an extension of workfare and activation logics which are more 
universally present in welfare state arrangements (and equally have an impact 
on national citizens). They are, however, given a clearer emphasis and visibility 
when newcomers are concerned. This goal is still the central emphasis of 
integration programs in Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland and in the 
Belgian region of Flanders. They were equally the main focus point of the first 
citizenship trajectories of Denmark and the Netherlands, but these countries 
have moved on. 
  Some states, indeed, go one step further in not only linking participation 
to integration programs to the entitlement to social benefits, but to equally 
attach consequences on the level of residence permits. Denmark and especially 
the Netherlands have adopted the most radical position in this respect. They are using the integration courses (and attached integration tests) as an additional 
means of immigration policy. The Netherlands use the citizenship test for 
newcomers as an outright and explicit selection criterion for non-EU 
newcomers, while the Danes have not hidden that their objective is to create 
obstacles for new immigrants. The position of the French, Germans and 
Austrians is less radical, but there is also a link established between 
participation to integration courses on the one hand and entitlement to 
(permanent) residence on the other hand. Joppke  (2007) correctly points out 
that the obligatory and repressive dimension of civic integration here has to be 
understood as a response to the fact that immigration to Europe is basically of a 
non-selective nature (in contrast to the policies of the classic immigrant nations 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zeeland). In the French, UK and Austrian 
cases the raison d’être of the link with residence entitlement is comparable to 
the link with social benefits: the aim is to discipline newcomers and diminish 
their dependency on the state welfare system. In the Danish, Dutch and 
German cases, however, there seems to be an additional goal of acculturation 
articulated in the content of the integration courses, when there is equally a 
stress put on knowledgeability of the history and culture of the receiving society. 
A third general goal which can analytically be d istinguished is the 
functionality of citizenship trajectories or citizenship tests as prerequisites for 
nationality acquisition. A certain degree of  linguistic  assimilation is formally 
demanded and tested in the UK (and might at one point be introduced in 
France). Linguistic assimilation plus acculturation is the goal in the Netherlands 
and  seems to  be  the direction Denmark and Germany wish to follow in 
naturalisation procedures. In the Dutch and Danish cases there is an explicit 
assimilationist  dimension. In the UK case it is officially denied the aim is 
assimilation, while Germany seems to find itself in an intermediate position.  
  Some of the aforementioned countries have only just recently launched 
their new integration programs and might well modify them the upcoming years 
after evaluation  (and depending on partisan position taking of ruling political 
majorities).  It is, hence, too early to try and pin them down in a clear cut 
typology. But there do seem to be a number of divergent tendencies in the 
underlying philosophies being  articulated in the different integration schemes. 
There is, in our opinion, for instance quite a d ifference between an integration 
program  ‘just’  being imposed in the light of a socio-economic activation 
philosophy (Sweden, Finland) or (also) aiming at other goals such as linguistic 
assimilation and acculturation  as preconditions for residence rights a nd 
naturalization. Joppke claims that the shared feature of civic integration is “that 
liberal goals are pursued with illiberal means, making it an instance of 
repressive liberalism”, which would be “gaining strength under contemporary 
globalisation” (Joppke, 2007: 1 & 2). That is certainly an interesting point but 
does it equally mean that all integration programs are basically the same? We 
think not. Furthermore, does the presence of integration courses in countries as 
the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden  – in the past traditionally seen as 
multicultural countries – and in a country like France – the assimilation oriented 
state par excellence -, mean that national models are dead? Once again, our 
answer is negative. 
 
The End of Multiculturalism? 
 
In the book Toward Assimilation and Citizenship editors Joppke and Morawska 
(2003) claim the rise of civic integration programs is an articulation of a more 
general shift towards the logic of assimilation and away from a multicultural 
agenda in integration policy paradigms of European states. One of us has claimed in the past that the introduction of citizenship trajectories (and 
citizenship tests) is not necessarily to be interpreted as a radical step away from 
multicultural policies towards assimilation policies, referring to empirical 
evidence available on the introduction of such schemes in Flanders (Jacobs, 
2004a). Accordingly, it was argued that the assertion made by Joppke and 
Morawska that there is an overall decline of official multiculturalism in Europe, 
and that the introduction of citizenship tests attests to this development, seems 
to be rather premature.  
Jacobs in particular criticized Joppke’s and Morawska’s interpretation of 
policy changes in the Dutch case. It was argued that one should take into 
account that the Netherlands no longer have clear cut consecutive periods of 
political consensus concerning integration policy but, on the contrary, 
experience a continuous struggle between integration discourses of competing 
political factions (Jacobs, 2004b). In other words, integration policy has become 
much more incoherent and is no longer a clear reflection of one overarching 
policy paradigm, but much more the reflection of party political power 
relationships and ad hoc policy compromises. Change is more rapid because 
the salience of the topic of immigrant integration has increased both for the left 
as for the right. As a result, Jacobs claimed it is too early to state that the 
assimilationist policy paradigm has ultimately won the battle in the Netherlands.  
As we have seen,  the Dutch policy has, however, in the meanwhile 
undergone such a radical modification that one can, today, indeed speak of a 
paradigm change towards an assimilationist model (albeit with still some 
elements left over of the multicultural scheme). So here we have to admit that 
recent history has proved Joppke and Morawska right for the Dutch case. 
Furthermore, recent policy developments in Flanders have downplayed the 
multicultural aspects and have upgraded the assimilationist elements of Flemish 
integration policy, compared to the situation three years ago (Jacobs, 2004a). 
Does this mean the end of multiculturalism in Europe and a new phase 
of policy convergence towards assimilation? Not necessarily. We acknowledge 
that  the rapid diffusion of civic integration policies reflects the increasing 
salience of the political topic of immigrant integration, related efforts of both right 
wing as left wing parties to reposition themselves on this issue throughout 
Europe and the increasing impact of benchmarking exercises on the EU-level. 
At the same time we claim this does not automatically lead to the inevitable end 
of multiculturalism (or other models for immigrant integration).  
Joppke and Morawska (2003)  make a distinction between “de facto 
multiculturalism” and “official multiculturalism”. The former would be required by 
the logic of liberal states, the latter implies a deliberate and explicit recognition 
and protection of immigrants as distinct ethnic groups. Accommodation of 
religious differences, they consider, epitomises the inevitable trend towards de 
facto multiculturalism in liberal states. Official multiculturalism goes beyond de 
facto multiculturalism, they note, in “engaging the state in the recognition and 
protection of immigrants as distinct ethnic groups” (2003, 10). This distinction 
does not necessarily make  the assessment easier of whether a country (still) 
has a multicultural policy or not. Indeed, recognition of distinct ethnic groups 
can be undertaken to different degrees and might simultaneously take place in 
some fields but not in others. Furthermore, it could be argued that de facto 
multiculturalism is of far more importance than official multiculturalism if the 
latter is merely limited to rhetoric. We could, of course, embark on a long debate 
on what precisely is to be understood by “multiculturalism”, the difference 
between “de facto multiculturalism” and “official multiculturalism” and whether 
“multiculturalism” is an appropriate concept altogether (see Vermeulen and 
Slijper 2003). We prefer not to go into this discussion – is the glass half full or half empty? - in depth, but inevitably a number of decisions on terminology and 
definition have to be made in order to be able to judge to what extent a 
particular policy towards ethnic minorities should be regarded to (still) be 
“multicultural”. 
Vermeulen and Slijper (2003) stress that the ideology of multiculturalism 
has the rejection of homogenisation and assimilation as its central tenet. If we 
take this general designation as the main point of reference, then integration 
courses and citizenship trajectories are clearly not multicultural. Their explicit 
objective is to achieve a certain degree of homogenisation, civic acculturation 
and (linguistic) assimilation (for a variety of reasons). 
 Vermeulen & Slijper, however, equally claim that the ideology of 
multiculturalism has three central characteristics: (a) the recognition of ethnic 
and cultural diversity; (b) the objective of social equality for ethnically 
differentiated groups; a nd (c) the objective of social cohesion which is best 
assured  – according to multiculturalists  – through recognition of ethnic and 
cultural differences. Some multiculturalists want to preserve cultural diversity at 
all costs  – even if it hinders equality a nd cohesion  – other multiculturalists 
applaud cultural diversity in combination with open intercultural communication 
and reject artificial and enforced preservation of cultural differences (Vermeulen 
and Slijper 2003). As far as we are concerned, we would label the former 
perspective as “segregationist” and only the latter as “multicultural”.  
For the purposes of this paper, we wish to consider the official 
recognition and endorsement of ethnic and cultural diversity as the central 
characterising element o f policy that could be designated as being 
“multicultural”. Formulated in a less abstract manner, this has a number of 
policy-making implications: (a) the notion of ethnicity and/or ethno-cultural 
minorities is used to start with; (b) it is seen to be acceptable and necessary 
that specific policy is developed for such ethnic minorities; (c) ethnic minorities 
are allowed to maintain and develop their cultural specificities; (d) host 
institutions are sensitive to this cultural diversity and  – to the extent that this is 
feasible – modify their procedures and practices in accordance; and (e) ethnic 
minority groups are allowed and stimulated to organise themselves on an ethnic 
basis – amongst other things for interest representation.  
We do not deny that this multicultural policy framework has been under 
constant attack and criticism the last couple of years in the Netherlands. One 
simply cannot deny that especially in the Netherlands, the classic multicultural 
model has been under substantial strain during the post-Fortuyn and post-Van 
Gogh period. We gladly admit that in quite some areas former multicultural 
policies have been downgraded or even withdrawn. Entzinger & Fermin (2007) 
have in this regard pointed to the abolition in 2004 of education schemes in 
languages of immigrant groups ( Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen) and 
the increasingly critical attitude Dutch policy makers have taken towards Islamic 
schools. Furthermore, subsidizing of ethnic minority associations has become 
much more conditional, in stressing the importance of integration effects and 
intercultural contacts. At the same time, however, in the period following the 
murder of cineaste Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim fanatic in November 2004, the 
Dutch government has reemphasized institutionalised  dialogue with ethnic 
minority associations
9.  
Neighbouring Belgian region Flanders has introduced Dutch-inspired 
assimilationist citizenship trajectories for newcomers, but has at the same time 
still held on to a multicultural policy framework for long(er) established 
immigrants. In some aspects it was even strengthened. Striking developments 
in Belgium are the preparations for state subsidising of mosques (payment of 
imams, costs of buildings) from 2005 onwards – as is also done for churches and synagogues – and the granting of holidays on religious festivities for Jews 
and Muslims in the Flemish education system. Consultation with immigrant 
organisation representatives was furthermore intensified in Flanders in several 
policy domains. Of course, policies a re not set in stone, so there is no 
guarantee that Flanders will keep on embracing a multicultural model 
indefinitely (see Jacobs, 2004a). But for the time being, one cannot claim 
multiculturalism is completely dead in the low countries. Yes, it is in a  deep 
coma in the Netherlands, but in Flanders it still seems to remain alive and 
kicking.  
 
Bringing National Models Back in 
 
Institutional approaches to ethnic minority politics, also know as the ‘political 
opportunities structure’ perspective, are quite popular in the literature on 
political participation of immigrants. According to Garbaye a historical 
institutionalist approach shows “hot institutions function as past political 
situations frozen in time which may define the possibilities and modalities of 
later developments” (Garbaye, 2005: 211). While the city level has been far 
from neglected (Penninx & alii, 2004; Garbaye, 2005), most authors primarily 
focus on the impact of institutions at the national level. Koopmans, Statham, 
Giugni & Passy (2005), for instance, show how national institutional frameworks 
and dominant discourses on ethnic minorities influence the forms of collective 
mobilisation by immigrant groups. Inspired by Brubaker (1992), several authors 
have started to talk about ‘national models’ and have interpreted them as being 
rooted to an important extent in long-standing national cultural understandings 
and legal frameworks of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations 
(see Favell 1998; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Fennema & T illie 2004; 
Penninx et alii  2004; Laurence & Vaisse 2006). As we have seen, Joppke 
(2007) questions their relevance in claiming it no longer makes sense to think in 
terms of national models now that we are confronted with convergence in civic 
integration policies. 
   According to us, distinct national policy traditions and related dominant 
discourses with regard to immigrant integration have not disappeared, although 
there are indeed some  striking  new convergences in particular domains (for 
instance policy with regard to newcomers) to be noted. Some countries, as the 
Netherlands, have indeed witnessed a paradigm shift or have, as Germany, 
made significant policy changes in particular domains as naturalization policy. In 
quite a number of fields, dominant discourses have, however, remained intact in 
several countries and existing institutional arrangements still tend to lead to 
path dependency in policy choices.  
Let us first take the issue of state-religion relations and the issue of 
space for public expression of a religious belief as an example. As is well 
known, the  Islamic headscarf has been a subject of public controversy across 
Europe (Verhaar & Soharso, 2004; Kastoryano, 2006; Bousetta & Jacobs, 
2006). In all countries which have in recent times been introducing integration 
programs and citizenship trajectories, dominant discourses, legislation and 
policy practices with regard to the wearing of the headscarf have remained fairly 
stable. As is well known, i n France the headscarf is banned for pupils and 
teachers in public schools alike. In  some German  Länder it is prohibited for 
teachers but allowed for pupils. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
wearing of the headscarf is generally allowed for both pupils and teachers in 
schools. In Flanders, schools take a pragmatic view on the headscarf and in 
general allow it for pupils. In Francophone Belgium, however, the French discourse and related institutional ban is being mimicked. Nothing has changed 
here since the convergent trend in the development of integration courses. 
Another domain in which national institutional traditions and dominant 
political discourses attest to quite some cross-national divergence (and national 
stability), is the field of demography and statistics. The sensitive issue of 
counting and classifying inhabitants of foreign origin or ethnic background is 
tackled quite differently across European nation-states. Anyone wanting to 
perform internationally comparative research on immigrants or ethnic minorities 
in Europe is unavoidably confronted with the most diverse types of national 
statistical data. Several countries traditionally even shun from producing such 
data. Schematically one can distinguish two traditions related to ‘ethnic 
statistics’ in Europe. In France and most southern European countries, the 
dominant statistical categorizations merely distinguish individuals on the basis 
of their nationality. It basically boils down to a limitation to two categories: the 
national and the foreigner. Often an additional distinction is made  among the 
foreign population between those coming from other EU-member states and 
those who do  not. In contrast, most northern European countries have been 
producing data on the ethnic and/or foreign origin of their populations in a more 
detailed manner. T he UK has for instance a system of self-identification of 
ethnicity, as is equally the case in the Baltic States. The Nordic countries and 
the Netherlands keep track of their ‘immigrant population’ by counting the 
number of persons who have parents (or grandparents) born abroad (and by 
distinguishing them according to country or region of origin).  Interestingly, 
Belgium is caught somewhere in between these two traditions (Jacobs and Rea 
2005).  
Partly related to traditions in (not) producing ethnic statistics, there are 
different traditions in stimulating public acknowledgement and political visibility 
of ethnic (or ethnicised) identities. In some countries immigrant associations 
have been financed by the state because they are immigrant associations and 
are seen to be legitimate political actors, while other countries consider ethnic 
and communitarian political identities as something to be avoided. Positive 
discrimination and affirmative action is applauded in some countries and seen 
as unacceptable in others. Policy convergence in the  field of newcomers’ 
integration  (and anti-discrimination law)  has in some cases – notably France  – 
perhaps stimulated debate on the issue of targeted policies, but most countries 
– with the exception of the Netherlands - have not seen radical modifications in 
their policies towards settled ethnic minority groups. 
Obviously, policies are not set in stone. Discourses which at one point 
in time were dominant in a particular country, can loose appeal. Issues like the 
access to citizenship or the significance of national identity, for instance, can 
become partisan symbols in political and ideological struggles between political 
parties. As a result, policies can be modified. One clear example, particularly 
stressed by Joppke (2007) i s Germany, which overhauled its nationality 
legislation in 2000 and introduced a form of jus soli for immigrant children born 
in Germany. Joppke also has a point when referring to increased emphasis in 
linguistic and cultural assimilation of newcomers in many European countries, 
including the Netherlands and the UK, which traditionally had been relatively 
forthcoming towards cultural differences. Belgium recently adopted a liberal 
nationality legislation and granted local voting rights to non-nationals, while this 
still seemed an impossible political step in the late 1990s (Jacobs, 1999). The 
empirical fact that a number of countries have changed (some aspects of) long 
standing policies, however, does not mean that the analytical approach of 
distinguishing political opportunity structures (Koopmans & Statham, 1999) or philosophies of integration (Favell, 1998),  and trying to assess their impact, 
becomes pointless.  
What is true, is that some of the “crude” classifications of the 1980s and 
1990s, for instance a very general distinction between a multicultural model and 
an assimilationist model, are no longer necessarily valid in the new millennium. 
In a number of countries, integration policies seem to have lost some of their 
internal coherence, making it more  difficult to pinpoint them as clear national 
models in line with typical philosophies of integration. Furthermore, EU-led 
convergence in antidiscrimination policies and more organic diffusion of 
integration programs across Europe has indeed made EU member states more 
similar. We need to re-evaluate our typologies making use of both theoretical as 
empirical insights.  In order to reclassify countries, empirical projects as the 
MERCI-project (Koopmans et alii, 2005), the  European Civic Citizenship and 
Inclusion Index (Geddes & Niessen, 2005) and the NATAC-project (Bauböck et 
alii, 2006) are to be cited as being of particular importance in constructing new 
analytical classifications. For the moment, this exercise is still to be done by the 
scientific community.  We hope this paper has been able to argue that the 
diffusion of integration courses and citizenship trajectories throughout Europe 
should not be interpreted as the sign that such endeavours have become futile. 
Integration policies of EU member states might be converging to a certain 
extent with regard to incorporation of newcomers, this does not mean that all 
policies towards ethnic minority groups and immigrants have become 
indistinctive. 
 
Conclusion and debate  
 
It cannot be ruled out that at one point in the future, immigrant integration 
policies of EU member states will be indistinguishable. For the time being this 
is, however, clearly not the case. Interestingly there is currently a certain 
convergence to be noticed in policies towards newcomers throughout Western 
Europe. T his is not the result of explicit and deliberate EU policy steering. The 
European Institutions have played a crucial role in setting the standards for 
antidiscrimination policy but, apart from that, have rather limited – if not to say 
practically no - impact on integration policies. Recent convergence of integration 
policies for newcomers is the result of  organic diffusion of policy schemes and 
visions from one country to another, without guided EU interference (and not 
even through the open method of coordination). The diffusion of civic integration 
policies, in our opinion, reflects the increasing salience of the political topic of 
immigrant integration and efforts of both right wing as left wing parties to 
reposition themselves on this issue throughout Europe, but without this leading 
automatically to the end of multiculturalism (or other models for immigrant 
integration). We claim contrary to Joppke (2007) that national models, as those 
proposed by Koopmans et al. (2005), still make sense. There is indeed some 
convergence in policy towards newcomers, but there is still sufficient divergence 
in integration policies (and related dominant political discourses) across nation-
states to analytically distinguish national integration models. Existing typologies 
might not be sufficiently adequate but this does not mean we should now think 
all integration policies are basically the same. In order to reclassify countries 
according to their integration policies, empirical projects as the European Civic 
Citizenship and Inclusion Index, the MERCI-project or the NATAC-project are to 
be cited as being of particular importance in constructing new analytical 
classifications (or, indeed, if this would be the case, in concluding that analytical 
distinctions have become superfluous in the light of overwhelming 
convergence). Without such fine-grained empirical analysis, potentially leading to new classifications of national models, debates about convergence or 
divergence of integration policies will remain discussions of the type whether 
the glass is half full or half empty. 
 
Notes  
 
1  See the press release of the European Council of 19/11/2004:                       
[ http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf ]. Other 
relevant documents on the issue are the Commission’s first response to the 
Basic Common Principles of the Council (COM/2005/0389 final), the Second 
Annual Report on Migration and Integration (SEC/2006/892) and the 
European Parliament Resolution on Integration of Immigrants 
(P6_TA(2006)0318). 
2  http://www.hoemoetikinburgeren.nl 
3  Information about the educational package is available on the following 
website: http://www.naarnederland.nl 
4  In the original plans this integration allowance was meant to be considerably 
lower than the corresponding welfare benefits Danes receive, but this idea 
was dropped after criticism on its discriminatory nature. 
5  http://www.mol.fi/mol/en/04_migration/index.jsp 
6  In practice, it boils down to a test of English. The ESOL Entry 3 level should 
be attained. This level corresponds broadly to the ability of holding “a 
conversation on an unexpected topic, that is workable, though not prefect, 
English” (Home Office, 2004: 11). 
7  Further information on the contents of the test, can be found at the following 
website of the UK Home Office: http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk 
8  When the answer related to a particular question does not easily fit into the 
forced choice format, we have put the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer between brackets, 
to indicated the correct response is a bit more complicated. 
9  For instance through the  Breed Initiatief Maatschappelijke Binding (BIMB), 
launched in January 2005. 
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